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6 Iraq’s Yazidis and ISIS
Recommendations
The case of the Yazidis and their suffering usually gains attention in the context of the 
struggle against the Islamic State (ISIS). A new approach geared towards addressing the 
concerns of the Yazidi community, beyond the paradigm of combating terrorism, needs to 
be developed. This is necessary for preventing the reoccurrence of such atrocities in the 
future. This strategy should include the following:
Suggestions to national and international actors 
• Establish an international protection mechanism and rebuild the conflict-affected ar-
eas in Sinjar in collaboration with Iraqi and Kurdish authorities, and support existing 
efforts towards criminal and social justice for Yazidis. These are urgent steps toward 
ensuring the survival of the Yazidi community in Iraq and enabling them to envision 
a future in the country.
• Support the international and national work being carried out to help violence-affect-
ed and displaced Yazidi communities in Duhok. The governorate’s health, education 
and humanitarian services have limited capacity and need support. In relation to this, 
arrange safe transport for Yazidi girls and women to enable their sustained access to 
physical and psychological treatment in Duhok.
• Amplify the voices of Yazidi women by including them in talks, negotiations, reconcil-
iation processes and peacebuilding and protection mechanisms.
• Tackle legal discrimination against women. For instance, the laws which allow only fa-
thers to pass religious and national identity to children – and prioritise fathers’ custody 
– exacerbate the problems affecting the children of Yazidi women and their ISIS captors.
• ISIS’ atrocities have encouraged changing gender norms and perceptions about girls’ 
education within the Yazidi community. Build on these changes by supporting female 
empowerment initiatives by the community, civil society organisations and Kurdish 
government authorities.  
Suggestions to all actors to reconsider prevalent thinking 
• Treat sexual violence in conflict as part of a continuum of violence against women 
(from domestic violence to legal discrimination to rape during war), not as a stand-
alone issue. 
• Avoid simplistic explanations of religion and culture in relation to women’s position 
in Iraqi society and adopt a holistic approach to tackling sexual violence. Consider 
the intersection of gender with other factors such as socio-economic status, minority 
position or geographical and urban/rural location.
• It is the responsibility of all actors to end violence and discrimination against women. 
Placing this burden primarily on women’s organisations removes responsibility from 
the actors who perpetuate patriarchy and discrimination. 
• Do not see international or Western actors as the devisors of frameworks of gender 
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equality. Women’s rights activism in Iraq is not a foreign import and has a long history; 
nor is feminism a Western idea. International and national actors should be aware of 
this and the multiple manifestations of feminism in different contexts.
Introduction
It has been five years since ISIS brought the Yazidi community in Iraq to the brink of 
destruction. In the summer of 2014, ISIS murdered thousands of Yazidis and took large 
numbers of women and children hostage. At least 10,000 of the half million Yazidis in 
Iraq were killed or kidnapped.1 According to the head of the Kurdistan Regional Govern-
ment’s (KRG) Yazidi Women Rescue Office, 6,417 Yazidis had been kidnapped and, by 
July 2019, 4,509 of them had been rescued.2 Some women and children held by ISIS have 
been re-captured by criminal gangs to be trafficked or sold back to their families. Those 
that managed to escape the brutal attacks have ended up in displacement camps scattered 
around the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), with a small number relocating to Western 
countries as refugees. The majority of Yazidis who remain in Iraq – over 300,000 – are still 
living in camps or thatched houses and tents across Duhok Governorate with no hope of 
returning, as both their homes and trust in their Arab neighbours have been destroyed.3 
There is also ongoing resentment towards Kurdish government security forces who failed 
to protect the area, which enabled ISIS’s easy takeover of Sinjar. Due to their dwindling 
numbers and dispersion across Iraq and all around the world, Yazidis fear the end of their 
existence as a coherent, living community in their ancestral homelands in Iraq.
This report shows that preventing sexual violence in conflict is not possible without tackling 
the underlying structural factors that foster this form of violence. Militant radical groups 
such as ISIS use specific gender norms in connection to perceived religious/sectarian iden-
tities in order to morally justify and organise violence. ISIS reinforced gender norms that 
perpetuate patriarchy and men’s control over women to organise the lives and behaviours 
of its recruits and the people under its control. ISIS’s attacks on the Yazidis showed again 
that gender (and gendered violence) is a key component of the politics of violence and 
cannot be reduced simply to an outcome of conflict. Therefore, gender is key not only to 
the prevention of conflict but also to how this is addressed in post-conflict periods.
The first part of the report explains the structural gender inequalities and minority–major-
ity relations in Iraq that facilitated the attack against the Yazidis. The second part looks at 
the impact of these attacks and how the Yazidi community responded to the tragedy. It 
traces the community’s response and transformation in areas related to gender and reli-
gious norms. It also examines how Yazidis see their position and future in Iraq. 
1   Valeria Cetorelli, et al., ‘Mortality and Kidnapping Estimates for the Yazidi Population in the Area of 
Mount Sinjar, Iraq’, PLoS Medicine vol. 14, no. 5 (2017), pp. 1–15. 
2   Mohammed Rwanduzy, ‘Number of Yezidi mass graves excavated now at 17’, Rudaw, 2 July 2019. Avail-
able at https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/02082019 (accessed 9 November 2019).
3   The Yazidi community inhabited the Sinjar and Bashika districts in Nineveh Governorate under central 
government authority and the Sheikhan district in Duhok Governorate under KRG authority. 
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Fieldwork was conducted during three separate trips in 2017 and 2018 to Erbil, Duhok and 
Baghdad.4 In total, 41 interviews and two focus group discussions were held with Yazidis 
and 18 interviews were conducted with local and international experts. Yazidi interview-
ees were displaced and non-displaced individuals, sexual violence survivors (female), 
non-community leaders, religious authorities, activists and NGO workers. Interviewees 
were chosen from a variety of backgrounds (gender, age, location, habitation in camp or 
outside camp, urban or rural background, socio-economic background and position in 
community) in order to provide a holistic perspective on the impact of genocide. Yazidi 
interviewees included members of all layers in the community, including the Yazidi leader 
Prince Tahseen (mir), Yazidi spiritual leader Baba Sheikh (sheikh), a number of pirs and 
several members of the murids.5
The non-Yazidi informants included health and legal authorities and civil society organ-
isations (both international and local) that carry out work to support the Yazidis and 
fight violence against women. The aim of speaking to this group was to capture wider 
debates and perspectives on the Yazidi experience. The research also relied on primary 
sources such as declarations by Yazidi leaders and material on ISIS’s doctrine on gender 
and Yazidis. This material helps situate the information gathered from the interviews on 
gender and community relations. The thematic data analysis of interviews focused on 
gender norms and Yazidis’ positioning of themselves within Iraq and internationally.
Structural Causes of Sexual Violence in Conflict 
Examining the gendered nature of contemporary conflicts reveals important insights into 
the dynamics and drivers of violence. In the analyses of conflicts, women are typically 
treated as faceless victims of war, contributing to their invisibility and leading to lumping 
of populations together as ‘womenandchildren’.6 Sexual violence in conflict does not 
stand alone and extreme incidents of cruelty are integral to other methods of warfare as 
a deliberate and systematic rule, as seen in Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).7 
4   Part of this fieldwork was conducted with the support of the Global Religion Research Initiative at the 
University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank Güneş Murat Tezcür, Bayar Mustafa, Tutku Ayhan and 
Jeen Malta for all their support for the research for this paper and in conducting the fieldwork. I would 
also like to thank all the interviewees for their immense contributions to the research and to Yasmine 
Kherfi for her help with transcriptions.
5   The Yazidi community is formed of different caste-like layers: murids (common people), pirs 
(members – usually elder – of a particular tribe with mentoring and leadership roles in the community), 
sheikhs (spiritual and religious class) and, on top of it all, the mirs (upper class or aristocracy). Marriage 
is not allowed between members of different layers.
6   Martha Thompson, ‘Women, Gender, and Conflict: Making Connections’, Development in Practice vol. 
16, no. 3-4 (2006), pp. 342–53, p. 348; Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics, 2nd edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 1.
7   Nicola Henry, ‘The Fixation on Wartime Rape: Feminist Critique and International Criminal Law’, 
Social and Legal Studies vol. 23, no: 1 (2014), pp. 93–111.
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Wider normative political, economic and social structures play a larger role than assumed 
in leading to violence against women in conflict. This is part of a spectrum of gender-based 
violence caused by normalised and systemic discriminative and unequal structures 
shaping women’s everyday lives and sanctioning male aggression.8 Indeed, gender-based 
and sexual violence in conflict happens more in countries with higher levels of institu-
tionalised gender discrimination.9 Justifications for the use of violence and experiences 
of violence are typically intersectional, meaning multiple identity-related or structural 
factors intersect to make certain groups more vulnerable. Specific ethnic or religious con-
structions of identity intersect with gender, leading to the targeting of civilians whose 
gender or sexual status intersects with a minority status.10
The Precarious Position of the Yazidi Minority in Iraq
Yazidis are estimated to number around half a million, spread through northern Iraq, 
northern Syria, western Iran, Turkey, Armenia and Germany. They are the second largest 
religious minority in Iraq, after Christians. Most Yazidis speak Kurmanji Kurdish, and 
many also speak Arabic. The Yazidi identity and religion are closely connected to the 
land. Many Yazidi shrines are scattered around Sinjar and Bashika districts in Nineveh and 
Sheikhan in Duhok, with their most important sacred temple, Lalish, located in Sheikhan.
The Yazidi community has remained on the ‘periphery of periphery’ of the societies among 
which they have lived, both socially and geographically, throughout history.11 Yazidis’ dis-
tinct identity is a mixture of religious and ethnocultural characteristics and genealogy. 
Yazidi beliefs and traditions are among the oldest surviving religions today. Internally, the 
community is imbued with tribal divisions, caste-like structures, the rural–urban divide, 
and geographical and political division. Marrying non-Yazidis is not allowed, as Yazidi 
identity passes from parents to children, with both parents required to be Yazidi.
Yazidis were under significant threat before ISIS’s attacks because meaningful and effec-
tive government mechanisms to protect minorities from targeted violence were already 
lacking.12 Minority communities in Iraq have experienced specific challenges since the 
2003 military intervention, including during the 2006–8 sectarian conflict and the attacks 
by ISIS and other extremist groups between 2014 and 2017. In these periods of violence, 
Christians and other minority communities were viciously targeted as individuals and in 
8   Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman, Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004), pp. 3–5.
9  Sara Davies and Jacqui True, ‘Reframing Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: Bringing 
Gender Analysis Back In’, Security Dialogue vol. 46, no. 6 (2015), pp. 495–512, p. 501.
10   Ibid, p. 505; Catharine MacKinnon, ‘Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights’, Harvard Women’s 
Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 5 (1994), pp. 5–16.  
11   Nelida Fuccaro, The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). Available at http://
tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRQ_16460_E.
pdf (accessed 9 November 2019).
12   Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, ‘Iraq: The Situation of Ethnic and Religious 
Minorities’ (Brussels: 2013).
 l i   ’, curity Dialogue vol. 46, no. 6 (2015), p . 495–512, p. 501.
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larger groups. In addition to becoming displaced, their lands and properties were confis-
cated and vandalised. The Iraqi political system and its party structures do not facilitate 
the representation of minorities’ concerns and interests, which exposes them to systemic 
discrimination in law and practice. This discrimination is exacerbated by the lawlessness 
and insecurity that accompanies sectarian and extremist violence.13
Historically, Yazidis were outsiders in the Ottoman millet system14 and large-scale military 
campaigns were carried out against the community. After the establishment of the Iraqi 
state, Yazidis remained on the periphery of society, mostly in rural border zones. With 
the establishment by the US and UK of a no-fly-zone after the 1991 Gulf War, the areas 
Yazidis lived in Iraq were divided. Sinjar remained under Iraqi authority, but Sheikhan 
was divided between Iraq’s Nineveh province and the Duhok area under Kurdish control. 
This arrangement continues today. The government of Iraq (GoI) and the KRG both claim 
control of Yazidi-populated areas in Nineveh.
Like many other minority communities in Iraq,15 the Yazidis’ presence in these disputed 
territories has put them in a precarious position. The GoI and KRG’s inability to agree on 
the territories’ status and continued competition over their control has led to their neglect 
– both in terms of infrastructure, education systems and economic situation, and in terms 
of security and protection. Minorities in these territories lack political advocates and rep-
resentation, and therefore have been particularly overlooked.16 This position pushed the 
Yazidis to ally with one of the governments and their political parties, which did not help 
to advance their cause.17
There is a long-term historical mistrust between the central government in Baghdad and 
the Yazidis, who have also had a sometimes fractious relationship with the Kurds. Yazidi–
Kurdish relations are complicated; having lived under Kurdish control since 1992, Yazidis 
in Duhok have become more integrated within the Kurdish region and sections of Yazidis 
have joined in the aspirations for Kurdish self-determination. However, the lack of pre-
ventive action and protection by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces for Yazidis in the Sinjar 
area during the ISIS attacks remains a sore point. On the other hand, the Duhok Gover-
norate in the KRI has accepted and provided shelter for Sinjari Yazidis who escaped ISIS. 
13   Sebastian Maisel, ‘Social Change Amidst Terror and Discrimination: Yezidis in the New Iraq’, The 
Middle East Institute Policy Brief vol. 18 (2008): pp. 1–9.
14   The Ottoman millet system administratively separated religious communities and acknowledged each 
community’s authority in overseeing its own communal affairs, primarily through independent religious 
court systems and schools.
15   In northern Iraq these include Assyrians, Chaldeans and Turkmens living in disputed territories and 
in and around Baghdad there are Baha’i, Mandean Sabean, Jewish and other Christian communities. 
16   Dave van Zoonen and Khogir Wirya, ‘The Yazidis: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict’, Report 
by Middle East Research Institute, 2017, p. 11. 
17   In Iraqi Kurdistan, minorities have allocated seats in the parliament, eleven out of 111 are reserved 
for Christians, Armenians and Turkmen, but none for Yazidis. In Baghdad, Yazidis get one seat in the 
Parliament through being considered as part of the Kurdish entity, not as a distinct minority. Ibid. p. 12.
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Gender Norms and Inequalities as Facilitators of Sexual 
Violence
Violence committed against Yazidi women and girls by ISIS is related to wider structural 
gender-based discrimination and other inequalities. The Yazidis’ position as a religious 
minority community, combined with ISIS’s religious and ideological norms, created 
further specific vulnerabilities for them as a non-Muslim community. ISIS’s gender norms 
and the wider gendered inequalities in Iraq are inextricably linked to the group’s deploy-
ment of sexual violence against Yazidi women and girls.
ISIS justified its aggressive strategies towards the Yazidi community (killing, hostage 
taking and forced conscription) through its interpretation of certain Islamic rules and 
practices. According to Dabiq, the group’s official publication, ISIS members, as ‘true 
believers’, sit at the top of the societal hierarchy, followed by other Muslims who are yet 
to become true believers. Then come Christians and Jews. At the bottom of the hierarchy 
are the mushriks (non-believers), which includes the Yazidis as ‘a pagan minority’ whose 
existence Muslims should question ‘as they will be asked about it on Judgment Day’.18
Yazidi women’s precarious position as members of a mushrik community was exacerbated 
by their gender. A woman could be forced to serve as a domestic servant, sexually abused 
and enslaved, commodified and sold. Sexual violence against Yazidi women created a 
sense of victory and cohesion among ISIS members. A piece in Dabiq written by a woman 
called Sumayyah al-Mihajirah defended slavery as a practice encouraged by ‘true’ Islam. 
She rejoiced in the entry of the first slave girl into her house and in the humiliation of the 
non-believers: ‘we thanked our Lord for having let us live to the day we saw kufr [rejection 
of Islam] humiliated and its banner destroyed.’19
These religious justifications do not, however, sufficiently explain the gendered violence 
implemented by ISIS. ISIS’s own gender norms and gendered hierarchies provide further 
pretext for its treatment of the Yazidis. At the top of its female hierarchy are the wives 
and mothers of ISIS fighters and at the bottom are the women of kufr. ISIS’s women are 
expected to live under their husbands’ authority. According to the group’s English publi-
cation, Rumiyah, a wife’s main responsibility is to be a ‘shepherd in her husband’s home’, 
defined as ‘a tremendous task and an enormous trust that has been placed on the Muslim 
woman’.20 A manifesto for women living under the Caliphate, written by the all-female 
Al-Khansaa Brigade in 2015, states that ‘her creator ruled that there was no responsibility 
greater for her than that of being a wife to her husband’.21
Although the statuses of Muslim and Yazidi women are clearly different in ISIS’s hierarchy, 
there is a continuity between the two. The difference is that Muslim women who adhere 
to ISIS’s ideology have more agency and see their position as an elevation. Yazidi women 
18   ISIS, ‘The Failed Crusade’, Dabiq, Issue 4, 11 October 2014, p. 14.
19   ISIS, ‘They Plot and Allah Plots’, Dabiq, Issue 9, 21 May 2015, Issue 9, p. 47.
20   ISIS, ‘The Ruling of the Belligerent Christians’, Rumiyah, Issue 9, 4 May 2017, p. 19.
21   Ibid, p. 17.
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and girls, who are seen at the lowest level of ISIS’s ‘female’ hierarchy, have no control over 
any decision and their wellbeing is fully dependent on the person who claims ownership 
of them. The degree of Muslim women’s and Yazidi women’s subjugation under ISIS are 
also different. However, in the end, both Muslim and Yazidi women are seen as subjects 
to male authority.
Gender Inequality in Iraq 
The gendered socio-economic structure ISIS tried to create did not exist in isolation 
from other social structures and gender norms in Iraq.22 It was simply an extreme form 
of pre-existing patriarchal practices, which are in one form or another prevalent across 
the world.23 Rampant gender inequalities, discrimination and violence against women in 
Iraq illustrate that there is a continuum of violence between everyday forms of violence 
and discrimination and ISIS’s gender norms. The fact that sexual violence in conflict is 
more common in societies with higher levels of gender-based discrimination shows this 
continuity.24
This is not to say that all types of gendered violence are the same; but the difference is in 
their form, not their essence. This is also not to say that gender inequality is experienced 
in the same way across Iraq. It varies historically, geographically, from community to com-
munity, based on ethno-religious background, between urban and rural areas, and based 
on socio-economic background.
In Iraq women experience a high degree of domestic and other forms of gender-based 
violence, discrimination in legal, political, institutional and socio-economic terms, and 
unequal access to education and employment. This is despite Iraq having a strong and 
resilient women’s rights movement, led by women constantly facing setbacks and lacking 
political support. The Iraqi Personal Status Law and Penal Code also contain discrimina-
tory clauses negatively affecting women’s rights.
The current constitution, adopted in 2005 following the US invasion, further damaged 
women’s legal position by allowing each province to draft its own family laws. This meant 
legislation could be based upon the majority’s religion.25 Increased conservatism, employ-
ment scarcity and insecurity due to violent sectarianism forced women to give up their 
jobs, confining them to the private sphere and making them more vulnerable to all forms 
of physical and psychological violence, trafficking, abduction and rape. Today, non-dis-
criminatory legal rules and policies are not fully implemented and programmes and action 
plans for women’s rights are not funded. There is also a backlash against women’s rights 
22   Gender norms and inequalities in Syria are also relevant here as ISIS expanded into Syria and several 
Yazidi captives were taken to Syrian cities such as Raqqa. 
23   Cynthia Enloe, The Big Push: Exposing and Challenging the Persistence of Patriarchy (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2017).
24   Davies and True, ‘Reframing Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence’.
25   Mishkat Al Moumin, ‘Constitutional and Legal Rights of Iraqi Women’, The Middle East Institute Policy 
Brief, no.1, October 2007. 
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activists’ work from Islamist and radical groups. With the increase in sectarian violence in 
Iraq, sexual violence has become even more pervasive, affecting women from all religious 
and ethnic backgrounds. Killing, rape, harassment and the abduction of women have been 
used to humiliate rival communities and settle scores. Women and girls have also been 
abused for financial gain through human and sex trafficking.26
The Iraqi government has done little to combat trafficking of girls and women, to pros-
ecute the criminals or to support the victims. The Iraqi judicial system tends to punish 
the victim rather than the offender, and the security services are unqualified to carry out 
operations against the perpetrators of violence against women in war and conflict.27 The 
majority of women who are subjected to violence and assault do not report incidents due 
to family or societal pressure, and if they do, they are sometimes killed in the name of the 
‘honour’ of the family. Women in detention in Iraq are routinely raped and tortured.28
In this wider context of violence against women and gender-based violence in Iraq since 
2003, women from minority communities are even more vulnerable. The lack of legal and 
practical protections and ongoing insecurity combined with religious extremist ideologies 
has further exposed Yazidi women to violence.
Consequences of Sexual Violence: The Yazidi Perspective 
The Yazidi community’s experience has left lasting scars, trauma and resentment. Yet, it 
has also led to unexpected outcomes for gender relations within the community. 
Gender Norms
Attitudes Towards Survivors of Sexual Violence
Female survivors who were held captive by ISIS and exposed to sexual and other forms of 
violence were initially hesitant about returning to their families and communities, fearing 
that they would be rejected, or that their male family members would kill them. One of 
the factors in this is that sexual contact with a non-Yazidi – non-consensual or otherwise 
– is grounds for leaving the faith.29 Moreover, according to Yazidi tradition, if someone 
leaves the community and converts to another religion, they are no longer accepted back 
into the community or to Yazidism.
However, Baba Sheikh, the spiritual father of the Yazidis, with the support of Yazidi 
religious authorities, issued a declaration in September 2014 welcoming back to the 
26   UN Iraq, ‘Women in Iraq Factsheet: Displaced Women and Women in Conflict’, 2015. Available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Woman-Day-English-FINAL.pdf (accessed 11 
November 2019).
27   Ibid.
28   Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Security Forces Abusing Women in Detention’, 6 February 2014. Available 
at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/06/iraq-security-forces-abusing-women-detention (accessed 11 
November 2019).
29   Conversation with Güley Bor, researcher and international lawyer specialising on the Yazidis. 
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community all Yazidi men and women who were held captive by ISIS and forced to convert 
to Islam. Yazidi women and girls were defined as ‘angels’ and ‘victims’ and were re-bap-
tised in Lalish, paving the way for wider community acceptance. This was a huge change in 
Yazidi religious practices, which all Yazidis interviewed for this research welcomed. After 
the declaration, the number of survivors who returned to their community increased.
Readjustment and acceptance have not been easy for female survivors. Less is known 
about male survivors of sexual violence by ISIS but cases of sexual violence against Yazidi 
boys have also been reported.30 Survivors and their families are still traumatised, and the 
stigma of being sexually assaulted continues. The families or the community do not always 
understand the trauma and the psychological impacts of sexual violence. Therefore, these 
girls are either expected to go back to their household responsibilities as before, or they 
live in relative seclusion, under pressure not to leave the house or to laugh, and to wear 
dark clothes. Suicide rates are high among survivors.31
The issue of children born to Yazidi women and ISIS captors is probably the most difficult 
to resolve for the community.32 Laws criminalising abortion makes it hard for women to 
choose this option and leads them to seek unsafe abortion.33 These children are usually not 
accepted by the community; several have been sent to orphanages in Baghdad and Mosul 
and there are efforts to relocate mothers and children abroad. This response reflects a 
desire to prioritise community cohesion, even if it comes at the expense of the choices 
and lives of the children and their mothers. The main reason is that for someone to be 
Yazidi, both parents have to be Yazidi. This is compounded by the National Identity Card 
Law 26/2 which states that the child shall follow the father’s religion.34
Talking about Sexual Violence 
Yazidis have been unexpectedly open about sharing their experiences of sexual violence 
and reacting to these atrocities. For instance, the survivor and Nobel Peace Prize winner 
Nadia Murad has been campaigning for ISIS perpetrators to be held accountable. Sexual 
violence is a difficult issue to make public and acknowledge in most societies. Despite this 
30   Arial Ahram, ‘Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 3 (2015), pp. 57–78. The 
account of the experiences of survivors reported in this paper rely on interviews conducted with female 
survivors.
31   Interviews with local NGOs.
32   According to three different NGO sources, the number of mothers with children from ISIS is around 
200 as of May 2018. The actual figure may be higher owing to concealment. Some women give their 
children to the PKK and, after returning to areas under PKK control, take shelter with their child. Yazidi 
survivors with children sometimes find different strategies to navigate this situation. Some claim to 
their families that they met a husband (usually dead or missing) at some point and the child is his. Even 
though this is not true, and the family knows this, they accept it. Some mothers want to keep the child, 
some do not.
33   Güley Bor, ‘Response to and Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Iraq: The Case of 
Shiʿa Turkmen Survivors in Tel Afar’, LSE Middle East Centre Report, October 2019. 
34   UN Security Council Resolution 2647 (April 2019) was the first time children born of rape were 
mentioned in the context of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.  
The Causes and Consequences of Sexual Violence in Conflict 15 
taboo within the Yazidi community, male community leaders and members, including 
brothers, fathers and husbands of survivors, have also openly addressed the topic. The 
Yazidis interviewed for this research, including survivors, said the world needs to know 
what they went through. 
According to one Yazidi community leader, an academic and ex-politician, openly talking 
about sexual violence was a significant step which triggered meaningful transformation in 
the community. He stated that, ‘Yazidi women were brave enough to break the taboo and 
talk about themselves and their experience. I think it’s the first time in history.’ A Yazidi 
woman in Duhok working at a women’s rights organisation said: 
The community from Sinjar is a closed community [but] when [survivors] spoke 
about their experiences and saw that the community is with them, they began to ask 
about their rights. And even now, at conferences and workshops they always ask about 
their rights. This made a big difference. 
An NGO worker providing psychological support to Yazidi survivors and their families 
added:
At the beginning, we faced many problems and challenges… [the community] refused 
our help because […] for some, when you say you have a problem, that means you 
are mad or crazy, especially when if it’s psychological. But not anymore. They ask for 
help. They want to change. They are tired of being silent. They want to speak and find 
solutions to their problems.
Education and Public Engagement
Another important change among displaced Sinjari Yazidis is their attitude towards edu-
cation and their engagement with NGOs. Six of the displaced Yazidi women interviewed 
specifically said that if the people of Sinjar had been better educated, the genocide would 
not have happened. A Yazidi woman working for an international NGO stated that ‘the 
Shingali35 women were initially reluctant but then started to participate in training and 
even started working’. She attributed this partly to the exposure of the conservative Sinjari 
Yazidi communities to the more open life of Yazidis in Duhok. 
Female Yazidi community members indicated that with the return of survivors, some 
Yazidi men’s attitudes towards women’s position in society has started to change. For 
instance, men now feel they should give girls more agency and enrol them in education 
so that they are better prepared to protect themselves in the future. A Yazidi NGO worker 
living in Duhok said: 
This made a difference for the community even when the Sinjari IDPs come here.36 
They meet the Yazidi community and learn from each other. This brought the com-
munities together […] When we opened the centre, it was very difficult for us to bring 
35   Shingal is the local name for Sinjar. 
36   The term ‘IDPs’ refers to Internally Displaced People. 
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in women, the camps being far. Some fathers, husbands or brothers didn’t let them 
[women and girls], but now it is easy for us to go to the camps and inform them about 
our activities in the centre. They are coming directly without asking.
Interviewees attributed these changes in attitude to multiple factors. The most important 
reason was that ISIS’s genocidal attacks made the community realise their vulnerability. A 
male Yazidi activist said:
Before it was the financial status of the family that would enable the girls to go to 
school. But after ISIS’s attack, almost 90 to 95 percent of the families are sending their 
girls to school… It is as if ISIS created a way of telling the people that school is import-
ant for your children.
He added that families who send their daughters to school ‘see education as very import-
ant. Yazidis have no power in the area or in general, so the way they see it, if you’re 
educated, you’re more powerful. Especially for girls and women.’ 
Some Yazidi respondents indicated that attitudinal change was relatively quick because of 
the inherent gender equality in the Yazidi religion and the flexibility of the faith. A Yazidi 
community leader argued that:
We have in our religion female holy persons, and we had a princess who was running 
the Yazidi community for 40 years – Mira Meyan Khatun. So the negative attitudes to 
women we previously practiced came from Abrahamic religions. 
A Yazidi male activist said that, ‘theologically, the Yazidi religion does not differentiate 
between men or women. But again, society prevails, and you’re living in a society where 
men always have the upper hand.’
Yazidi activists also noted that wider improvements in women’s rights in the KRI had 
positively affected Yazidi women living in Duhok. The Kurdish parliament passed laws 
that improved the status of women in the Personal Status Law and the Penal Code. A male 
Yazidi who is an academic at Duhok University said, ‘in Duhok most Yazidi women are no 
more underdogs, they get their salaries, they go to universities, and they are free to choose 
their husbands.’ 
Yazidis’ Perception of their Future in Iraq and International Engagement
Another impact of the atrocities is the change in the Yazidi community’s perception of 
their future position in Iraq and, linked to this, their engagement with the international 
community and foreign support. This emphasis on the international dimension mani-
fested itself in different ways in the interviews. 
All Yazidi interviewees who survived ISIS’s attacks and sexual violence said they want to 
leave Iraq for Germany, Canada or Australia. Although, ideally, they want to go back to their 
homes in Sinjar, they think this is no longer possible. They cannot imagine going back to 
living with their Sunni Muslim neighbours because many of them aided ISIS, killed Yazidis 
and raped their daughters. However, there are also accounts of Arab Muslims helping 
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Yazidis escape, and some Yazidis indicated that their neighbours had to obey ISIS’s orders 
or risk being killed. Nonetheless, they cannot imagine cohabitation with Sunni Arabs. 
For Yazidi community leaders, reconciliation is close to impossible. The Yazidi Prince 
Tahseen, who recently passed away, explained: 
If only a hundred fifty or so men were killed, we would’ve probably been able to rec-
onciliate and make up with each other again, to live with each other again, but after 
taking 3,000 to 4,000 women and girls, it’s very difficult to go back to living together.
Yazidis do not share similar sentiments towards other Muslim communities in the region, 
such as the Kurdish or Shiʿa Turkmen. However, there is a general frustration with the lack 
of protection by Kurdish and Iraqi forces during ISIS’s attacks in 2014.37
Yazidis also think returning to Sinjar is not possible because of the lack of security and 
inability to guarantee that such attacks would not happen again. Moreover, there are 
few services such as schools, hospitals and other basic infrastructure. The director of a 
women’s rights organisation in Duhok said there exists a ‘big need for the international 
community to think about rebuilding the areas… for Yazidi people, if there is any oppor-
tunity to leave, they will go because it has been four years, nothing has changed.’ She also 
noted there is an ongoing demographic change in the Sinjar area due to Arabs moving in. 
A Yazidi community leader pointed to politics as a reason for the lack of support for 
returning home: 
[The central government, Arabs and Kurds] see our presence here as non-perma-
nent because they think we will leave; the majority of Yazidis are already living abroad 
anyway. For political actors, Yazidis are not important, they cannot tip the balance of 
politics in Iraq. 
Moreover, Yazidis also do not believe they will receive justice in Iraq for the atrocities they 
experienced. There is no effort to bring justice or at least to provide protection for Yazidis 
if they go back to Sinjar. This lack of hope for change in their situation is a key driving force 
behind Yazidis leaving Iraq.  
Another dimension that came to light during the interviews is the Yazidis’ engagement 
with the UN and other international platforms on genocide and sexual violence in conflict 
to make their voices heard. Yazidi activists, both in the region and the diaspora, are striv-
ing to get ISIS’s atrocities against Yazidis to be defined as genocide by the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the US House of Representatives. Several 
experts have already defined the atrocities as genocide – acts of violence that intended 
to destroy in whole or in part the Yazidi community and were carried out through mass 
37   Shiʿa Turkmen women and men were also forcefully deported by ISIS, executed and abducted, and 
were furthermore exposed to sexual violence, but this was not as systematic as it was towards Yazidis. 
Güley Bor, ‘Response to and Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Iraq’, October 2019.
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executions, abductions, forced conversions and sexual violence.38 The identification and 
documentation work, including examining mass graves, is ongoing. Nadia Murad’s cam-
paign to raise awareness is the most notable example. These activists are making Yazidi 
voices heard by utilising international legal and policy frameworks on genocide and sexual 
violence in conflict. 
However, as Yazidis and NGO activists have noted, international responses have not been 
consistent or sustainable. There is a heavy focus on eliminating ISIS but Yazidis fear that 
ISIS – or a similar variant of the phenomenon – will return because the root causes of the 
problem have not been addressed in a sustained way. A (non-Yazidi) NGO director said:
The international community focuses on the short term without thinking of the long-
term impact of their role […] The root of the crisis remains even after ISIS, because 
ISIS did not end. I think the international community is responsive when there is a big 
issue like when ISIS came here, but they don’t sustain the response.
Underlying Reasons for Change
ISIS’s attacks on the Yazidi community led to significant changes for the community in 
gender norms and relations with the outside world. As a result, the community is reposi-
tioning itself. It is transforming internally, as the changes in religious (including the ruling 
on re-acceptance to the faith in 2015) and gender norms show. Externally, Yazidis are 
trying to reconfigure their future to ensure their survival as a community and to gain inter-
national support. 
The key underlying reason for this change is the fact that Yazidis feel extremely angry after 
experiencing yet another genocide. The Yazidi vernacular labels the persecution and vio-
lence they experienced at the hands of the local rulers and imperial authorities in history 
as firmans.39 All Yazidi community members interviewed defined ISIS’s atrocities against 
their community as the latest firman.
An anecdote shared by a Yazidi interviewee describes the Yazidis’ perception of their 
situation:
I think it was in 1936, my grandfather had a friend who was Jewish, and another friend 
who was Christian. All three were sitting in a café in Bashika. Of course, at the time, 
Jews were being kicked out of Iraq. Gradually, they lost their jobs, could not work in 
hospitals and schools, could not go to school. The Jewish friend said ‘you know, today 
is Saturday. And ironically tomorrow is Sunday. And Wednesday is not that far’. He was 
implying [that] ‘today is Saturday’ means we’re [to be] kicked out as Jews, ‘tomorrow 
38   Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, ‘‘They came to destroy’: ISIS crimes 
against the Yazidis’, 2016, A/HRC/32/CRP.2; Fazil Moradi and Kjell Anderson, ‘The Islamic State’s Êzîdî 
genocide in Iraq: The Sinjār Operations’ Genocide Studies International vol. 10, no. 2 (2016): pp. 121–38. 
39   The name given to decrees and military campaign orders by the Ottoman sultans. The campaigns 
of the Kurdish Ottoman Emirs Bedirkhan Beg and Muhammad Pasha of Rawanduz in the nineteenth 
century are still widely remembered by the community members. 
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is Sunday’ means the Christians will be out, and then finally, on Wednesday, as it is the 
Yazidi religious day, you’ll be kicked out.
However, Yazidis believe that their situation is even worse because of the particularities of 
their religion. As a Yazidi community leader said, 
To be Yazidi is difficult, it’s not an easy religion. If a Muslim or Christian migrates, 
they can find a mosque or church anywhere. A Yazidi needs to celebrate religious 
festivals here on the land, he should go to Lalish. Yazidis should maintain the feeling 
of affiliation to the land. We are practicing rituals that have existed in this land since 
before Christ.
Therefore, although Yazidis do not see a future for themselves in Iraq, they are concerned 
about the future of their community due to its dispersion around the world and the loss 
of connection to the land and its holy temples. 
Conclusion 
Violence committed against Yazidi women and girls by ISIS is not an anomaly simply 
related to the group’s extremist nature. Rather, conflict-related sexual violence takes place 
against the backdrop of structural gender-based discrimination and other inequalities. The 
Yazidis’ position as a religious minority community, combined with ISIS’s religious and 
ideological norms that justified attacks on non-Muslims, created specific vulnerabilities. 
In this case, the perceived superiority of Muslim identity versus the perceived inferiority 
of Yazidi identity intersected with gender norms around women’s position in society. 
Yazidis connect the atrocities to long-term disadvantages of being a minority group living 
in disputed territories in Iraq and the pervasive prejudices towards their community and 
its religious identity. Within wider majority–minority relations in Iraq, gendered hierar-
chies and structural inequalities, ISIS’s attacks against the Yazidis are only an extreme 
form of an already ongoing discrimination against minorities and women in general. The 
genocide and its outcomes cannot be understood separately from this wider context. 
The Yazidi community’s views on why they were targeted in this way and how their society 
has been affected by these atrocities reflect their awareness of the precariousness of their 
minority position intersecting with gender inequalities. Despite admitting the prevalence 
of patriarchal rules in their community (attributed by the Yazidis to living in a conser-
vative society), after the attacks the Yazidi community changed religious norms about 
re-acceptance in the hope of containing negative attitudes within the Yazidi community 
and to help survivors re-integrate into the community. The onus is now on the GoI, the 
KRG and the international community to enable their recovery as a community, to build 
on these positive developments, and to tackle the factors that contributed to this in the 
first place.
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